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Abstract 
Theories from diverse areas of psychology postulate that affective stimuli facilitate approach 
and avoidance behavior because they elicit motivational orientations that prepare the 
organism for appropriate responses. Recent evidence casts serious doubt on this assumption. 
Instead of motivational orientations, evaluative coding mechanisms may be responsible for 
the effect of stimulus valence on approach-avoidance responses. Three studies tested 
contrasting predictions derived from the two accounts. In support of motivational theories, 
stimulus valence facilitated compatible approach-avoidance responses even though 
participants had no intention to approach or to avoid and the valence of the response labels 
was dissociated from the approach-avoidance movement (Study 1). This was also true when 
participants were not required to process the valence of the stimuli (Studies 2a and 2b). These 
findings are at odds with the evaluative coding account and support the notion of a unique 
automatic link between the perception of valence and approach-avoidance behavior.  
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Recognizing good or bad stimuli in the environment and acting accordingly certainly is 
one of the most important regulatory needs of organisms. Particularly, quickly escaping from 
dangers and grasping opportunities to gain rewards are part of the behavioral repertoire that 
ensures survival in environments with scarce resources and threatening foes. Accordingly, 
numerous classic and current theories from diverse areas of psychology suggest that approach 
and avoidance behaviors are driven by specialized systems which evolved to efficiently 
process valence and trigger functional responses (e.g., Davidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis, & 
Friesen, 1990; Darwin, 1872; Dickinson & Dearing, 1979; Gray, 1994; Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 1990; LeDoux, 1996; Lewin, 1935/1967; Öhman, 1987; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). 
In this view, valence processing and the resulting motivational tendencies are attributed a 
special status among psychological processes, because they are so fundamental for an 
organism’s survival (cf., Bargh, 1997; Zajonc, 1980). Recently, this position has been 
questioned both on theoretical and empirical grounds (Eder, Hommel, & De Houwer, 2007). 
From this perspective, valence has no special status among other stimulus features such as 
size, color, and location. Correspondingly, approach and avoidance behaviors may not be 
regulated by distinct motivational mechanisms. Instead, they are seen as behaviors that follow 
general principles of action control (Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Eder & Rothermund, 2008).  
One current manifestation of this overarching debate centers on the observation that 
perceiving positive stimuli facilitates simple approach behaviors (e.g., pulling a lever toward 
the body or moving a figure on the screen toward the stimulus) whereas perceiving negative 
stimuli facilitates simple avoidance behaviors (e.g., pushing a lever away from the body or 
moving a figure away from the stimulus; Chen & Bargh, 1999; De Houwer, Crombez, 
Baeyens, & Hermans, 2001). Traditionally, such compatibility effects were interpreted as 
being caused by motivational orientations immediately triggered by automatic stimulus 
evaluations (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Neumann, Förster, & Strack, 2003). Recently, however, 
some researchers have argued that these compatibility effects may simply follow from general 
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mechanisms of action control that are not specific to valence. The theory of event coding 
(TEC; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001) describes such a general mechanism 
of action control. According to the TEC, actions are represented by feature codes that refer to 
the anticipated distal effects of the action. Further, actions and perceived stimuli are 
represented in a common representational domain. As a consequence, response execution is 
facilitated when the stimulus and the action representation share a large number of features. 
The very same principle was suspected to be responsible for facilitation of approach-
avoidance behaviors. Particularly, valenced stimuli may facilitate compatible approach-
avoidance behaviors because of an overlap of stimulus-valence and response-valence (Eder & 
Rothermund, 2008; Lavender & Hommel, 2007). In this view, response-valence stems from 
the intentional labeling of the responses in evaluative terms. Labeling a behavior as approach 
(avoidance) attaches positive (negative) valence to the behavior representation. The 
evaluative codes of the behavior representations may then overlap with stimulus valence and 
thus cause approach (avoidance) to be faster with positive (negative) stimuli. Note, that this 
view predicts that any behavior that is represented with evaluative codes will be facilitated by 
valence-congruent stimuli. In contrast, motivational theories share the assumption that 
valenced objects trigger functional responses, that is responses changing the distance between 
the self and the object in the service of fundamental needs like survival and nurturance. 
Furthermore, the evaluative coding account predicts facilitation of responses only if the 
responses are intentionally labeled in an evaluative way (Eder & Rothermund, 2008, p. 265). 
According to the motivational view, however, approach-avoidance responses are facilitated 
independent of an intentional labeling of the responses in terms of approach-avoidance. 
To test the evaluative coding hypothesis against the motivational view, Eder and 
Rothermund (2008) studied joystick-movements that were either labeled in terms of 
approach-avoidance (i.e., move toward vs. away) or labeled in an evaluative way, but 
unrelated to approach-avoidance (i.e., move upward vs. downward). According to 
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independent tests, the labels upward and downward are evaluated positively and negatively, 
respectively. Consequently, the evaluative coding hypothesis predicts that upwards and 
downwards movements in response to valenced stimuli should generate the same kind of 
compatibility effects as approach and avoidance movements. From a motivational 
perspective, however, no response facilitation should occur under these conditions. The 
results were strongly in support of the evaluative coding hypothesis: positive (negative) 
stimuli facilitated movements that were described with positive (negative) labels, irrespective 
of whether the labels referred to approach-avoidance or to upward-downward and irrespective 
of the concrete movement. As such, the observations of Eder and Rothermund may suggest 
that the often observed compatibility effects between stimulus valence and approach-
avoidance behavior are a consequence of general mechanisms of action control that are not 
specific to valence or approach-avoidance. If this interpretation is valid, it seriously questions 
the widespread idea that valenced stimuli automatically induce specific motivational states of 
approach and avoidance and therefore facilitate corresponding behaviors.  
The present studies aimed at providing a more sensitive test of the motivational view 
than those of Eder and Rothermund (2008). In the latter studies, the intentional labeling of 
joystick movements fully determined the compatibility effects. We suspect that the movement 
itself had no impact because joystick movements are ambiguous regarding the direction of 
distance-change. Specifically, the same movement can mean approach or avoidance 
depending on whether the self or the object serves as the reference point (Seibt, Neumann, 
Nussinson, & Strack, 2008; see also Markman & Brendl, 2005). Therefore, effects in the 
joystick task might necessarily depend on the labeling of the responses. If this reasoning is 
correct, the joystick task does not allow a sensitive test of potential effects of motivational 
orientations, which should occur independent of labeling.   
To overcome this limitation, we used an adapted version of the manikin task of De 
Houwer et al. (2001). In this task, participants move a figure on a computer screen toward or 
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away from a stimulus by pressing the up and down keys on a keyboard. The stimulus always 
appears centered, whereas the figure either appears in the upper or lower half of the screen. In 
the present experiments, we instructed our participants to move the manikin upward 
(positively labeled response) or downward (negatively labeled response) without making a 
reference to approach/avoidance or toward/away. Depending on the starting position of the 
figure, upward and downward movements implied moving toward or away from the stimulus. 
Thus, motivational compatibility effects can be tested in addition to and independently from 
evaluative coding effects (see Figure 1).  The manikin task has the advantage that the 
responses are unambiguous regarding distance-change (cf. Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, in press), 
and thus effects on approach-avoidance responses can be tested independent of labeling the 
responses in terms of approach-avoidance. From the perspective of motivational theories, 
participants should be faster to move the manikin toward positive and away from negative 
words than vice versa, even though they did not intend toward-away movements but upward-
downward movements and even though the valence of the response labels was dissociated 
from the approach-avoidance direction. In addition, we expected to replicate the evaluative 
compatibility effect (i.e., faster when instructed to move upward for positive and downward 
for negative words) that has been demonstrated by Eder and Rothermund (2008).  
STUDY 1 
Method 
Participants 
Fourty-seven non-psychology students (20 female) from the University of Würzburg 
took part in the study in exchange for a chocolate bar. The mean age was 23.7 years 
(SD = 2.9).  
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Materials and Procedure 
We used 30 positive and 30 negative nouns as test stimuli and 4 positive and 4 negative 
nouns as practice stimuli (Hager & Hasselhorn, 1994; Klauer & Musch, 1999). The manikin 
was a picture of a simple figure of about 2.8 cm length. Participants were instructed to 
imagine being the figure and to move with that figure by pressing the up and down keys of the 
keyboard. Following De Houwer et al. (2001), a trial started with the figure appearing either 
in the upper or lower half of the screen. 750 ms later, a word was presented in the center of 
the screen. Participants were instructed to move with the figure as quickly and accurately as 
possible upward (downward) when the word was positive (negative), or vice versa. They had 
to press the respective key three times to move the figure across the screen. Depending on the 
initial position of the figure and the movement direction, the figure either stopped at the edge 
of the screen or close to the word. The screen turned black 50 ms after the third key-press. In 
case of an incorrect response, an error message appeared immediately after the first key-press 
for 500 ms. The time between the onset of the word and the first key-press served as the 
dependent variable. Participants completed one evaluation compatible (positive-upward, 
negative-downward) and one evaluation incompatible block (positive-downward, negative-
upward), each consisting of 60 trials that were presented in random order. Each block was 
preceded by eight practice trials. The order of the blocks was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
Results 
Incorrect responses (6.0%) and latencies below 150 ms and above 1500 ms2 (4.8% of 
the correct responses) were discarded. We submitted the response latencies to a 2 (evaluative 
compatibility) X 2 (motivational compatibility) analyses of variance (ANOVA) for repeated 
measures1. Responses in the evaluation compatible block (positive-upward, negative-
downward) were faster than responses in the evaluation incompatible block (positive-
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downward, negative-upward), F(1,46) = 14.87, p < .001, ⎜2 = .24 (see Table 1). In addition, 
responses on motivation compatible trials (toward positive, away from negative) were faster 
than responses on motivation incompatible trials (away from positive, toward negative), 
F(1,46) = 8.61, p = .005, ⎜2 = .16. Furthermore, the ANOVA revealed a significant interaction 
of evaluative and motivational compatibility, F(1,46) = 4.74, p = .035, ⎜2 = .09. Simple 
comparisons indicated a motivational compatibility effect (faster toward positive and away 
from negative words) only in the evaluation compatible block, t(46) = 4.33, p < .001, but not 
in the evaluation incompatible block, t < 1.  
Discussion 
In line with the evaluative coding account and replicating Eder and Rothermund (2008) 
valence facilitated responses that were labeled in an evaluatively compatible way (upward-
downward). More importantly and supporting the motivational view, valence facilitated 
behaviors that resulted in a compatible distance change even though participants mentally 
represented their behaviors as up and down movements, with up and down movements being 
independent of actual distance-change. Thus, a motivational compatibility effect was 
observed even though participants did not have the intention to approach or avoid and even 
though they did not label their behaviors in approach-avoidance terms. The latter finding is at 
odds with the evaluative coding account, but can be explained by motivational theories.  
Interestingly, valence facilitated compatible approach-avoidance responses only when 
the valence of the upward-downward response labels was congruent with the stimulus 
valence. A possible explanation for this finding is that during the evaluation incompatible 
block (i.e., positive-downward, negative-upward), participants had to deploy more executive 
control than during the evaluation compatible block. In the incompatible block, participants 
had to overcome automatically activated but incorrect response tendencies, whereas in the 
compatible block they could simply go with their immediate response tendencies. It seems 
Unintentional Approach-Avoidance 9 
 
possible that the deployment of executive control might erase all bottom-up modulations of 
the responses, including modulations by motivational orientations. This explanation implies 
that the motivational compatibility effect should be independent of evaluation compatibility 
when evaluation compatible and incompatible trials are intermixed so that the deployment of 
executive control remains more constant throughout the experiment. This hypothesis was 
addressed in the following Studies.  
STUDIES 2A AND 2B 
Studies 2a and 2b tested if the motivational and evaluative compatibility effects depend 
on evaluation intentions. To this end, participants responded with upward-downward 
movements according to the grammatical category of words. Stimulus valence was varied 
independent of grammatical category. Whereas the motivational view assumes facilitation of 
approach-avoidance responses even if stimulus valence is not intentionally processed (Chen 
& Bargh, 1999), the evaluative coding account predicts evaluative compatibility effects to be 
reduced when participants do not need to evaluate. Lavender and Hommel (2007) even failed 
to find effects of stimulus valence under these conditions. To examine the generality of the 
findings, we conducted two studies with different methods. In Study 2a, participants moved a 
manikin similar to Study 1. In Study 2b, participants moved a dot on the screen upward or 
downward by moving a pen on a writing tablet. 
Method 
Participants 
In Study 2a, 94 non-psychology students (45 female) from the University of Würzburg 
participated in exchange for a chocolate bar. The mean age was 23.6 years (SD = 4.3). In 
Study 2b, 34 undergraduate students (27 female) from various faculties at Ghent University 
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participated in exchange for €5. All were native Dutch speakers with a mean age of 20.2 years 
(SD = 2.0). 
Materials and Procedure 
Study 2a. We used 20 positive and 20 negative nouns as well as 20 positive and 20 
negative adjectives as test stimuli. The adjectives were taken from Wentura, Rothermund, and 
Bak (2000). The nouns were the corresponding nouns to the adjectives. Practice stimuli were 
two words of each stimulus category. The procedure was the same as in Study 1 with the 
following exceptions. Participants were instructed to move with the figure upward 
(downward) when the word was a noun (adjective), or vice versa. The mapping between 
grammatical category and upward-downward response was counterbalanced across 
participants. Following eight practice trials, participants completed 80 test trials in random 
order.  
Study 2b. Stimuli were eight positive and eight negative nouns as well as eight positive 
and eight negative adjectives (Hermans & De Houwer, 1994). Five other positive and 
negative nouns and adjectives were chosen as practice stimuli. Pen movements were recorded 
using a pen and a horizontally placed digitizer (WACOM writing tablet), designed to measure 
pen pressure. At the start of each trial, three red rectangle bars of 1.5 cm height and 8 cm 
width appeared on the screen, positioned at the top, center, and bottom of the screen. 
Additionally, a blue circle appeared either in the upper or lower half of the screen (midway 
between two rectangles), accompanied by a 200 ms warning tone. Participants were instructed 
to place the cursor (an orange dot) in the blue circle by moving the pen on the digitizer. A 
word appeared in the central rectangle 750 ms after they had placed the pen on the starting 
position, while at the same time the blue circle disappeared with the orange dot remaining on 
the screen. Participants were asked to move the dot by moving the pen on the digitizer as 
quickly and accurately as possible upward (downward) when the word was a noun (adjective), 
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or vice versa. When the dot met the border of the upper or lower rectangle bar the word 
disappeared and the next trial started. A red cross appeared for 400 ms in case of an incorrect 
response, and “te laat” (too late) appeared when no response was given after 3000 ms. The 
time between the appearance of the word and the moment when the starting point was left 
(with pen pressure exceeding 0.24 N) served as the dependent variable. Each participant 
completed two blocks, one with the response mapping noun-upward and adjective-downward, 
and one with the reversed mapping. The order of the blocks was counterbalanced across 
participants. Each block consisted of 128 trials presented in random order and was preceded 
by 20 practice trials. 
Results 
Study 2a. Incorrect responses (8.5%) and latencies below 150 ms and above 1500 ms 
(9.1% of the correct responses) were discarded. A 2 (evaluative compatibility) X 2 
(motivational compatibility) ANOVA yielded the expected motivational compatibility effect 
(i.e., faster when approaching positive and avoiding negative words), F(1,93) = 7.56, p = 
.007, ⎜2 = .08 (Table 1). Neither the main effect of evaluative compatibility effect, F < 1, nor 
the interaction was significant, F < 1.6. 
Study 2b. Incorrect responses (0.15%) as well as latencies below 150 ms and above 
1500 ms (0.89% of the correct responses) were discarded. A 2 (evaluative compatibility) X 2 
(motivational compatibility) ANOVA showed the expected effect of motivational 
compatibility, F(1,33) = 12.25, p = .001, ⎜2 = .27 (Table 1). Neither the main effect of 
evaluative compatibility nor the interaction was significant, all Fs < 1. 
General Discussion 
The results of three studies support the motivational view of approach-avoidance 
behaviors. Responses to valenced stimuli were faster when they implied a compatible 
distance-change (i.e., positive-toward, negative-away) than when they implied an 
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incompatible distance-change (i.e., positive-away, negative-toward). Most importantly, this 
effect occurred even though participants did not intend to approach or avoid but mentally 
represented their behaviors as up and down movements, with up and down movements being 
independent of actual distance-change. Thus, approach-avoidance behaviors were facilitated 
although the valence of the response labels was dissociated from the approach-avoidance 
direction. This finding is at odds with the evaluative coding account of approach-avoidance 
behaviors (Eder & Rothermund, 2008; Lavender & Hommel, 2007), which suggests that 
response facilitation is only due to (in)compatibility of stimulus valence and response label 
valence. We observed effects of stimulus valence on unintended approach-avoidance 
responses when participants had evaluation intentions (Study 1) as well as in the absence of 
evaluation intentions (Study 2). While in Study 1 the motivational compatibility effect was 
only significant in the evaluative compatible block, in Study 2 it occurred independent of 
evaluative compatibility. This supports our reasoning that the interaction between evaluative 
and motivational compatibility in Study 1 was due the block structure of the task. 
Corroborating the generality of the findings, these results were obtained with two different 
response modes, namely moving a figure by pressing a key (Study 2a) and moving a dot by 
moving a pen (Study 2b). Together, the present findings corroborate the assumption of a 
unique automatic link between stimulus valence and motivational orientations that cannot be 
reduced to a more general mechanism of action control such as the one described by the TEC 
(Hommel et al., 2001).  
Importantly, in Study 1 we also observed effects of stimulus valence on intended 
upward-downward responses, thereby replicating the results of Eder and Rothermund (2008). 
In particular, responses in compatible trials (positive-upward, negative-downward) were 
faster than responses in incompatible trials (positive-downward, negative-upward). However, 
this evaluative compatibility effect depended on participants’ intention to process stimulus 
valence, as it did not occur when they responded according to the grammatical category 
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(Studies 2a and 2b). This observation is consistent with previous findings in the framework of 
the evaluative coding account (Lavender & Hommel, 2007).  
We suspect that previous research did not reveal motivational compatibility effects 
independent of response labeling because the responses were ambiguous regarding their 
distance-changing consequences. In particular, pushing and pulling a joystick like in Eder and 
Rothermund’s (2008) studies can either mean pushing the stimulus away from the body and 
pulling it toward the body, or reaching for the stimulus and withdrawing the hand from it 
(Seibt et al., 2008). In Lavender and Hommel’s (2007) study, participants moved a doll from 
a plate positioned in front of the computer screen to a plate nearer to the screen (but farther 
away from the participant) or to a plate farther away from the screen (but nearer to the 
participant). Motivational compatibility effects can only be tested when participants perceive 
the movement as changing the distance between the doll and the stimulus. However, it is 
possible that they perceive the movement mainly as changing the distance between their body 
and the doll. The possibility of focusing on different distance-changes introduces error 
variance, thereby decreasing the power of the test to detect effects of unintentional valence 
processing (cf. Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, in press). In contrast, the responses in the manikin 
and the pen-moving task are unambiguous regarding distance-change. In both tasks, the 
change of the distance between the stimulus and the manikin or the dot can be clearly seen on 
the screen. Furthermore, the distance of all stimuli to the participants’ body remains constant, 
excluding the possibility that participants focus on distance-changes relative to their body. 
Another advantage of our adapted manikin task is that it allows excluding the 
alternative explanation that participants re-labeled the responses in terms of approach-
avoidance movements. Re-labeling is likely to occur if it reduces the complexity of the task 
(cf. Eder & Rothermund, 2008). In our task, re-labeling the responses in terms of toward-
away would rather increase task complexity. Using the instructed labels implies a very simple 
rule: positive - upward, negative - downward. Re-labeling the behaviors in terms of distance-
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change would yield a more complex rule, for instance "If the word is positive and the figure 
appears above the word, then move away by pressing the up key".  
In sum, our findings indicate that two mechanisms may proceed in parallel when one 
encounters emotionally significant stimuli. As suggested by the evaluative coding view, 
evaluation intentions may modulate to what degree stimulus valence activates responses that 
are labeled in an affectively compatible way. For instance, if we were about to decide 
between being aggressive (negatively labeled action) or diplomatic (positively labeled action), 
encountering something negative might facilitate the first action. The motivational 
mechanism may operate independent from and in parallel to the evaluative coding 
mechanism. In particular, stimulus valence elicits motivational orientations, resulting in the 
activation of behavioral tendencies that increase or decrease the distance between the self and 
the stimulus. This mechanism operates independent of evaluative response labeling as well as 
independent of behavioral and evaluation intentions, thereby automatically fulfilling 
important regulatory needs of organisms (cf. Lang et al., 1990). For instance, when a car 
speeds toward us, this mechanism would let us quickly jump away, irrespective of what we 
are intending at this moment and irrespective of how we label our response. Importantly, this 
mechanism does not inflexibly activate concrete motor programs such as flexing or extending 
the arm (e.g., Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993). Instead, it activates behavioral 
tendencies that have adaptive consequences in the given context. In other words, approach-
avoidance behaviors are conceived of as being represented in terms of their distance-changing 
consequences rather than in terms of their motor programs (Strack & Deutsch, 2004; van 
Dantzig, Pecher, & Zwaan, 2008). In essence, our findings corroborate the idea of a distinct 
motivational mechanism that efficiently processes emotional stimuli and quickly triggers 
functional responses.  
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Footnotes 
 
1 We conducted preliminary analyses that included the counterbalancing factors order of 
blocks (Study 1) and mapping of grammatical categories and upward-downward responses 
(Study 2). In Study 1, the interaction between order of blocks and evaluative compatibility 
was significant, F(1,45) = 6.51, p = .014. The evaluative compatibility effect was positive in 
both order groups. Yet, it reached significance only when participants first completed the 
evaluation incompatible block, t(45) = 4.68, p < .001, but not in the reverse order, t(45) = 
1.13, p = .26. In Study 2a, the main effect or interactions with the counterbalancing factor 
were not significant, all Fs < 1.7. In Study 2b, the main effect of mapping of grammatical 
categories, F(1,33) = 4.47, p = .042, and the interaction between mapping and evaluative 
compatibility reached significance, F(1,33) = 4.38, p = .044. Yet, the evaluative compatibility 
effect was not significant in any of the mapping conditions, ts < 1.7, p > .10. 
2 This cutoff was chosen based on the distribution of the response latencies as well as 
based on previous research that compared different criteria for outlier elimination in the 
manikin task (Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, in press). 
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Table 1 
Mean Response Latencies (in ms) as a Function of Evaluative Compatibility and Motivational 
Compatibility in Studies 1 and 2. 
 Evaluative Compatible Evaluative Incompatible 
 Motivational 
Compatible 
Motivational 
Incompatible 
Motivational 
Compatible 
Motivational 
Incompatible 
Study 1 747 (107) 781 (119) 820 (146) 825 (147) 
Study 2a 888 (129) 909 (140) 893 (126) 900 (138) 
Study 2b 629 (93) 638 (88) 630 (93) 639 (97) 
 
 
Note. Standard deviations are printed in parentheses. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Illustration of the experimental variations. 
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